Archived posting to the Leica Users Group, 2007/01/15
[Author Prev] [Author Next] [Thread Prev] [Thread Next] [Author Index] [Topic Index] [Home] [Search]At 04:25 PM 1/15/2007, B. D. Colen wrote: >:-) >By the way - Has anyone thought about the fact that the American industrial >enterprise, and the fact that it, unlike Germany's manufacturing effort, >was >not being bombed out of existence, had allot to do with our being >ultimately >able to prevail over the Nahzees? BD This had a significant effect but German production just wasn't on par with ours or, for that matter, with that of the British. Bear in mind that a standard tool at Wetzlar through the life of the mechanical Leica cameras and in Sweden through the life of the Hasselblads was a rubber hammer, to bend everything to fit. Such never took place in Rochester, New York, I suspect, or in Delaware, Ohio. The British were outproducing the Germans in everything -- aircraft, guns, ammunition, submarines, surface vessels, tanks, und so weiter -- before the Battle of Britain and kept up this lead through the War. The addition of the US industrial base -- weakened as it was by the VERY late turn to mobilization and the neglect of factories caused by a decade of Depression-era idleness -- simply ensured an Allied victory. Speer attempted to turn Germany from an industry of excellent, hand-fitted products to one of mass-production but his efforts were late and were often thwarted by his political rivals such as Goering and Himmler. One example: shortly after he was appointed the Minister for Armaments, Speer placed the head of Zeiss, Heinz K?ppenbender, in charge of the German optical industry. Speer then told K?ppenbender to rationalize EVERYTHING optical within the German sphere, to include French and Czech and Roumanian companies. In the end, K?ppenbender stopped Leitz lens production and restricted camera production to small runs of IIIc cameras for export to Sweden and Switzerland and Spain to pay for Swedish ball-bearings and Spanish Wolframite and the like. Zeiss then had excess lens production capacity, so K?ppenbender directed that Carl Zeiss Jena produce Contax RF BM lenses in LTM to be sold with these export cameras. Leitz spent the later War years cranking out artillery gunsights and rangefinders and, of course, those prized "blc" Dienst-fernglass binoculars. Speer and K?ppenbender increased German optical production four-fold and more over its 1940 levels, which is why so many of these "blc" binoculars appear in the US market as their original owners, who had captured them on the field of battle, die off. Speer made similar efforts in every aspect of German industry but his efforts were thwarted by the "round the clock" bombing of the "Mighty Eighth" and Bomber Command. Still, he managed to have German aircraft production reach its highest levels in late 1944 but, by that time, the destruction of the German transport grid ensured that airplane motors remained at one location, airframes at another, and guns at a third, and mating them up became impossible in a world of collapsed tunnels and bombed bridges. An interviewer once remarked to Speer that one of the great issues in the Allied air war had been the US insistence on having a central office for selecting targets, something which "Bomber" Harris found impossible to accept. Speer's response was to point out that he did not know whether Germany would have benefited more from a US-dominated central-targeting office or a British-dominated one, as neither air force seemed capable of understanding what hurt Germany the most, the destruction of the transport grid and the elimination of the artificial fuel factories, until the closing days of the War. Marc msmall@aya.yale.edu Cha robh b?s fir gun ghr?s fir!